

## Dan Graham

**Announcer:** Welcome to the Eventual Millionaire podcast – with your host, Jaime Tardy. Real talk and real advice from real millionaires, with a sharp focus on you – the Eventual Millionaire.

**Jaime:** Welcome to Eventual Millionaire. I'm Jaime Tardy and today I'm super excited to be here at BuildASign with Dan Graham. He started this company many years ago and I'm so excited to go through the evolution of it. It's a huge office – I'll post pictures of how cool it looks in here. Thanks so much for letting me come here today.

**Dan:** Yeah, it's good to see you again.

**Jaime:** So tell me a little bit about what this started as. You guys can't see this, but there are tons of people working here right now and I know that's not how you started, so tell me how you got started.

**Dan:** Yeah, right now we have about 120,000 square feet and about 300 employees but it definitely didn't start that way. My background is actually in computer science – that was what my undergraduate degree was, here in Austin, Texas. After I graduated I went to law school at UT. I was interested in doing something other than programming for a living and I was looking at different graduate schools. While I was in law school I partnered up with some friends of mine who I had known since junior high school and started a web development company that was doing consulting work for small and medium sized businesses in Austin and we would look at their business models and come up with ways that we thought they could utilize some of the new web technologies out there to enhance their business model either through cost savings with their workflow or going out and finding new revenue and new customers online.

**Jaime:** I have a question on that – why didn't you go after law? I'm a programmer too – I started with that, I wasn't a marketer. How did you get into that piece?

**Dan:** So essentially the web business was all word of mouth. My partners and I were developers so we could put together really nice web solutions for all different types of companies and through that word of mouth we had a regular stream of business. It was really just a way to earn some beer money while we were at school.

**Jaime:** Okay, so sort of like a side thing you were doing while at law school.

**Dan:** Yeah, I was on my way to getting a law degree and starting to practice intellectual property law, so taking a lot of classes in cyber law, e-commerce law, businesses and corporations and stuff like that.

**Jaime:** Was that fun?

**Dan:** It was, I really enjoyed law school. It's a real challenging school, it's a lot of problem solving, you see a lot of different scenarios, do a lot of case studies, learn about a whole bunch of different types of businesses and situations, so I definitely enjoyed my time there.

**Jaime:** I usually don't hear people go 'Oh, I really enjoyed law school!'

**Dan:** There are parts that are fun and parts that aren't. You don't have any homework and there are no tests – 100% of your grade is one test at the end of the semester so the two weeks leading up to that suck.

**Jaime:** So you're good under pressure! So when you started this business you didn't have a goal to have 300 employees?

**Dan:** No, BuildASign was actually a concept – the idea of putting a Photoshop-style tool on the web that would allow customers purchasing sign or print products the ability to design their own stuff was a concept that we pitched to a local print company that had really high costs and was looking for a way to utilize the web. We had this idea, we had seen it in some other spaces, and we pitched it for \$7,000.

**Jaime:** Good beer money!

**Dan:** Yes, exactly. He said that was way too expensive and turned us down. We had done all of these mockups of the site and things, about how it would work, and we were really excited about it, so we started to look at the market and realized it was very fragmented – there were about 150 sign shops in Austin alone, tens of thousands across the country, so we decided to build a prototype and then try to sell it door-to-door and license it. So we went from offering it to one client to trying to offer it to hundreds of clients but what we found was that most of the sign shops are very small mom and pop shops, maybe \$300-500,000 in revenue, the owner is pulling in a medium sized paycheck and is employing their entire family in the office. So when we went in and said 'We have this solution that is going to save you a bunch of money. You can fire your graphic designer and your receptionist and cut costs,' they were like 'Oh, you mean Uncle Joe and Cousin Martha?' so it was a really high sell and we couldn't really get anyone to buy into the product and agree to pay us a monthly subscription. It was also untested – these shops had a hard time visualizing what it would be like for their customers to purchase sight unseen, without the relationship of coming into the shop, so we were unsuccessful licensing the product.

**Jaime:** What year was that?

**Dan:** This was mid-2005.

**Jaime:** Yeah, so ordering something that you've never seen before online is a little iffy anyway.

**Dan:** They had held off against the internet wave. This was 2005, it wasn't like it was the mid-90s or something, so we were surprised at the resistance.

**Jaime:** But you were also geeks so you were like 'No, computers are awesome!'

**Dan:** Yeah, 'Computers can solve everything. Why would you want to interact with a person when you could just order in your pajamas?'

**Jaime:** 'Who care about Uncle Joe, come on!'

**Dan:** Exactly. So we said 'Alright, well we think that this is a great idea but we're having trouble selling it from a cost saving perspective so let's prove that it can go and get new revenue.' If we could prove that it could get new revenue then we could go back to those companies and pitch it on that premise.

**Jaime:** How many 'No's did you get?

**Dan:** We probably went to 20-25 local sign companies and just got rejected at every single place.

**Jaime:** What did that feel like?

**Dan:** It was hard, for sure. We had a lot of ideas that got rejected – we had about four projects going on at the same time, that were all us trying to prove a concept to a market, and BuildASign was one of those four.

**Jaime:** What were the other ones?

**Dan:** We had one that was an online photo gallery system for professional photographers, one was a municipal contact management portal – so a city manager who's having to deal with all of the different departments and keep information updated will be able to use this system to manage that – and then we had an online department payment system for college students, so they wouldn't have to go down and turn in a check every month, they could just do it through an online system.

**Jaime:** That's four completely separate businesses and you were trying to pitch all of them at around the same time?

**Dan:** Yeah, we were developing three of them and one was in the idea stage.

**Jaime:** And this is just you going 'Let's find something that's going to work'?

**Dan:** 'Let's find a platform that we can then go and find a customer for.' It was very much not the traditional way of identifying a market and then building something to fit the market.

**Jaime:** Not a lean startup at all.

**Dan:** No.

**Jaime:** But it still worked for you!

**Dan:** It's great for a bunch of software guys who don't like talking to people.

**Jaime:** 'I'm just going to code for a while and hope somebody likes it.'

**Dan:** 'We're going to figure it out on our own and we're going to throw it out there into the world and hopefully someone will see it and pay us money for it.'

**Jaime:** Which is funny because people will be like 'How is that working for you?' but it is working for you!

**Dan:** We did alright with one of those four ideas.

**Jaime:** So tell us about the evolution – how did you figure out which ones worked versus which ones didn't? Because a lot of people have so many ideas and they don't know which one will work. How did you know which one would rise to the top?

**Dan:** For us it was about revenue. We were going to trade shows, pitching the municipal portal idea, we were getting partners to pay for the online photography gallery, and with BuildASign, when we went to prove the model, we dived into online marketing, learning how to use Google AdWords. We made a whole bunch of mistakes – the first time we used Google AdWords we set aside a budget of \$100 for the day and it was gone in like three seconds and we got zero orders. We didn't know if it would work so we tabled the idea of AdWords and randomly, about a month later, we got an order from somewhere in the middle of Illinois and three days later we got another order from across the state in Illinois and the only thing that we could think of was they must have come in during that three second window and just waited a month to buy. So those two orders we about \$150 apiece and so we went back and looked at our Google AdWords campaign and started diving into it, learned a little bit more about it and realized we were just bidding on the search term 'signs' which was catching all kinds of search queries – so we were showing up when people were searching for things like 'signs of pregnancy', 'signs of the apocalypse,' as opposed to just 'yard signs' or something like that. So we learned about negative matching and how to break down the key words and do a much better job so we went back to the drawing board and did a much better job of building our online marketing account and actually started to get a steady stream of orders which was great but also a problem because we aren't sign printers.

**Jaime:** You didn't have the backend to do that.

**Dan:** We had no capability to make anything but our site looked amazing! It said 'Three day turnaround time guaranteed, quality satisfaction guaranteed.'

**Jaime:** That's what programmers do – 'This looks great! I can't do any of it but it looks great!'

**Dan:** So we were debating whether to call the customers and say 'Just kidding! We don't actually do anything,' but we ended up going back to these sign shops that had rejected our software and said 'Hey, we know you don't want to buy our software but can you help us produce our stuff?' and that was hard for a couple of reasons and one was that they didn't have any price lists and we needed the price up front and they all wanted to wait and see how busy they were. Every sign shop that we talked to had this mysterious variable in their pricing called the asshole tax – they would adjust their price based on how much they liked you, which is really hard to code on an ecommerce site.

**Jaime:** It's a random number! That's awesome and horrible that they did that.

**Dan:** Absolutely. But that's what made the industry great for disrupting, that sort of old style mentality around selling.

**Jaime:** That's crazy. If you hadn't got those two orders from Illinois you would never have done AdWords and this would not exist.

**Dan:** For sure.

**Jaime:** That's crazy. Thank goodness!

**Dan:** Yeah, absolutely.

**Jaime:** Did you drop the other ideas as this started picking up?

**Dan:** Not immediately. That fall semester, when I was finishing my law degree, we were doing all three at the same time. We started to get these orders and started to outsource to a local print shop and we did that for about a month and a half, at which point they refused to increase their capacity with our increasing volume. They didn't really like the orders that we were bringing in because they had a very high overhead and fixed cost structure and they normally didn't do one-off teeny orders, they wanted big runs and all we were sending them were small orders, and we also weren't sure how sustainable our volume was going to be and they didn't want to hire for that and so I started driving over to the shop in between classes to say 'Look, you guys have to get our stuff out. We're going to have missed deadlines,' and they just said 'Well, if you want it to get out you're going to have to help.'

**Jaime:** Put on an apron? Really?

**Dan:** Yeah, I started going over there every day between classes, working at the shop, getting trained on all of the machines and I was a volunteer employee for about a month until the volume grew and outstripped me. Not only was I volunteering but the pricing we had negotiated with the shop had labor built into it so I would go and work for free for an afternoon and then I would go back to our 10x10' office and cut them a check out of QuickBooks for the labor I had just done. So it really wasn't scalable.

**Jaime:** What? You were working for negative!

**Dan:** That's right, I was working for negative money. It wasn't too investable at that point! But what happened is they said 'Look, here's a key to the shop. We shut down at 6:30, you're welcome to come in after hours.' So every night my partners and I, along with my girlfriend at the time, now wife, whoever we could bribe to come in with a six-pack of beer we would pull in and we would work until 3-4am every day. Again, working for free and then paying them for our work, but we were able to keep up with the volume. We continued to do that for another month before it just wasn't sustainable anymore and that was when we made the decision to shut down everything except BuildASign. It was going really well; we were doing a significant volume at the time.

**Jaime:** Do you remember what it was?

**Dan:** In the last six months of 2005, which was really that first startup period, we did about \$250,000 in revenue.

**Jaime:** Just from AdWords?

**Dan:** Yes, all AdWords.

**Jaime:** So what did the other ones do? Do you remember?

**Dan:** Not even worth mentioning. I think we had about \$15,000 on deposit from three different photographers for the gallery system and we had sold the municipal portal system to two or three counties for maybe \$15-20,000.

**Jaime:** So it's not like those couldn't have worked?

**Dan:** Potentially. The nice thing about the BuildASign growth model was that, at the beginning, it was fueled entirely by online marketing, where you can increase sales by turning a dial, unlike a traditional sales model where you have to knock on more doors and hire a sales team, so it fit our developer mindset really nicely.

**Jaime:** Definitely. 'Computer – more money!'

**Dan:** Yes, as long as we had the capacity we could just keep cranking it up, and as we got better at online marketing and better at managing the Google AdWord accounts it became easier and easier to scale.

**Jaime:** Awesome. Now, the thing that everyone is thinking is 'Oh, well that was back then, when AdWords was easy and fun and cheap. Lucky him, he got in back then,' so let's talk about online marketing now, because you guys have 300 people now so you must have figured something out. What do you think the state of online marketing is now? Give us the lay of the land and what works for you.

**Dan:** Online marketing is clearly still a huge component of our business. This year we will probably spend, I would say, about \$9-10 million with Google alone. They send us free pens all the time! The funny thing about Google is that they have so much money, even with an account that size they're just like 'Thanks for your business, I guess.'

**Jaime:** Lucky them!

**Dan:** Yes. Now we spend money on Facebook and everybody else out there, affiliate marketing, daily deals, we do a lot of different online marketing stuff, like with eBay and Amazon.

**Jaime:** Really?

**Dan:** Google and search marketing is still a huge part of what we do, SEO and all those other types of marketing. It is far more competitive and as more competitors come into the market there are still ten spots available to be seen with search marketing but those spots just become more expensive and so if you have been in the space for a longer period of time and have the opportunity, as we have, to be one of the first movers, then means we've got really efficient manufacturing processes, we have great bulk buying deals with our suppliers, which gives us more margin to play with, which allows us to stay competitive in the online space. A lot of competitors that we see come into our space are coming from one of two extremes –they're either a traditional manufacturer who's saying 'I want to get some of that internet thing.'

**Jaime:** 'Come on, give me some of that online stuff!'

**Dan:** Exactly. But they don't know what they're doing so they'll outsource the web development and then they'll outsource the online marketing and a lot of online marketing firms will charge 10-20% of ad spend so you lose points all along the way, plus they are probably a smaller company so they have smaller, less efficient machines and they have smaller buys, so their margins are more compressed and overhead is probably a larger percent of their revenue and so they don't have the

leverage and the buying power to compete and be able to afford to spend as much money to acquire new customers as we do.

**Jaime:** So they sort of get pushed out of the market.

**Dan:** It's tougher for them.

**Jaime:** And you've been in it a long time so it makes a lot of sense. Tell me, though, with the 80-20 rule for your marketing, what is the 20% that gives you the 80%? Because with any business there are a thousand things – you're doing all of these things, like eBay – but what's giving you the most growth and maybe we can dive into that a little bit?

**Dan:** I think the two different types of search marketing are still the big piece for us. There are some that are ramping up – Facebook has been doing a much better job over the last 6-8 months of providing the tools necessary to track and measure and figure out your ROI and hit different audiences.

**Jaime:** I'm thinking, especially for your market, people are looking stuff up on Google – 'I want to buy a sign' – whereas on Facebook they're just hanging out, so it seems like they wouldn't be specifically looking for a sign. How would you make Facebook work for you?

**Dan:** The conversion rates are lower because of that but the impressions, clicks, are cheaper. But Facebook works better for consumer products and less so for business products, so it's better for the products that we sell that look like nice pieces of artwork on the wall that incorporate photos and things like that. Facebook is a huge photo sharing tool so you've already got people looking at photos saying 'Oh, it would be nice if I could look at that more often,' and you can target audiences based on what else they like, so we can find groups that are fans of Crate & Barrel or Bed, Bath and Beyond or photography or something like that and market our relevant products to them. It is much more of an impulse buy marketing strategy on Facebook but it has been successful for us in the recent past and we've been ranking up quite a bit.

**Jaime:** Nice, it works really well for consumers. I thought you guys mostly did business to business. Which one is bigger in the company right now?

**Dan:** Business to business is bigger, roughly two thirds of our business. Consumer is ramping up really fast – we have some new products that are doing very well, like Canvas, which we started from scratch three years ago and it will be about \$23 million in revenue this year, just that one product. So we've seen a lot of movement on the consumer side, which is really exciting.

**Jaime:** That's insane. How much does your company do total?

**Dan:** We'll do \$71 million this year.

**Jaime:** Nice, that's awesome! I know you're the guy who oversees everything – you have other people who do this for you – but do you have any tips on online marketing, especially for somebody at the very beginning trying to figure out what works for them? Because there are so many options online to start with, so what do you do?

**Dan:** I think search is a great place to experiment because you can do trial and error very quickly for a small amount of money. A lot of people spend their dollars on SEO first because it's cheaper but the challenge with that is that a big component of SEO is link building and a big component of link building is knowing what keywords you want to rank and when deciding what keywords you want to rank for really what you care about is conversion rate and how do you know what keywords will be good for converting? A great way to figure that out is by trying all of those keywords out on SEO first – you can turn it on and turn it off, get the data and then use that data to make informed decisions around product listing ads on Google, to inform SEO on Google and also figuring out your audiences to some degree as well. So I can go online and tell Google 'Hey, I just want to show up for 'signs',' and then I can look at what traffic is coming to my site and break out traffic by more detailed keyword categories – say 10% of people actually search for 'yard signs', 20% of people search for 'banner signs', 30% of people search for 'Halloween signs' and I can figure out that there's a huge Halloween market that I didn't know existed so I can go on Facebook and start targeting costume photos and that sort of thing – or maybe the big category is 'dog on leash signs' and I know I've got a lot of dog owners. You can use SEM as a way to buy data on your traffic and who's out there looking for your products already and then use that to segment out markets.

**Jaime:** Do you suggest somebody learn that on their own or should they hire a company? I know you guys learned it on your own because you were broke at the beginning, but what do you suggest right now?

**Dan:** It's really hard to find a company that will work with a small account, it's not worth their time, so if you're just starting out with a business and you're not yet sure where your traffic is going to come from or how to drive traffic, I would suggest tinkering with it yourself – but you need to get informed, unlike we were when we started, about how it works and how to use it appropriately, but then you can use that to feel out different keyword sets in different markets and then if you see some that look promising then maybe, depending on the level of comfortability, you bring in a firm and pay them on a project basis if possible to go in and try to optimize some of those audiences.

**Jaime:** I have people getting really frustrated with stuff like that, though, like how you guys lost the first \$100 really fast, so how long should they invest into learning this stuff and testing? I know it's going to vary but, still, people can give up really too soon.

**Dan:** It depends on the person. If you're a typical entrepreneur, ADD, you can't sit there and do spreadsheet work, if that's not your thing then I think you should go and find a firm and pay them a flat rate to come in and do some testing. Explain what you're looking for – 'Hey, I don't know what's going to work. This is the product or service I'm trying to sell, these are the markets that are out there, can you help me build an AdWords campaign?' and just try to get a fixed rate upfront. If you get into hourly and percent of ad spend it will be misaligned at that point and they're going to be biased to spend as much of your money as possible, so if you can keep it flat rate with the promise of 'Hey, if you can figure this out then I will use you as my vendor,' then they have an incentive to use that \$500 or \$1,000 or whatever the project fee is to really figure out what's going to work so they get the follow-up business.

**Jaime:** Because as long as you're being profitable you'll put a lot more money into it anyway.

**Dan:** Exactly. That's the great thing about search engine marketing – as long as you've got a positive return there's no maximum budget because you'll spend every additional dollar that you can as long as you're getting more than a dollar back in profitability.

**Jaime:** That's awesome. I want to switch gears a little bit – you started with just a couple of guys and now you've got over 300 employees. How did that grow? How did you know when to hire your first couple of people and how did it get so ridiculously huge?

**Dan:** It was really a process of necessity. When we started out there were four of us – four partners – and we split roles in a mutually exclusive way. One guy was programming, one guy was customer service and boxing, one guy was graphics and kind of UX and feature design and I was basically doing the work that the other guys didn't want to do, so I was the accountant and a lawyer and I did a lot of the manufacturing and the actual sign production.

**Jaime:** You were like 'This is a great job!'

**Dan:** So we would hire based on our ability to get orders out, so as we grew we didn't have enough people boxing so the first hires we made were on the manufacturing side. I started doing way too much paperwork and graphics prep and we saw a way to automate a bunch of that but we didn't have time to do the software development so we hired a software developer. Every hire was based on an ROI calculation of 'What is this going to allow us to do? Is this going to save us money directly or allow us to focus time where we need it or continue to ramp revenue or get new machines in to keep up with the growth?'

**Jaime:** Was it just a crazy growth the entire time?

**Dan:** Yes, in the first year we did a little over \$3 million in revenue.

**Jaime:** What? That's insane!

**Dan:** And then year two was \$8 million and it's just grown from there. Those first two years were the most disruptive to our infrastructure, obviously, because we went from four employees to probably 50 or 60 in two years.

**Jaime:** That's crazy. How did you manage that and not go crazy? Or did you go crazy?

**Dan:** There was a lot of sleeping on the floor at the office, pulling all-nighters and covering shifts. Turning up the volume on sales leads was easy, we understand the software development world pretty well and we knew how to scale that but the big challenge for us was the manufacturing and the customer service, so at one point we decided to just take the phone number off the website and not have customer service, which tanked sales so we put it back up.

**Jaime:** That's smart – you tested, you learned. Good job!

**Dan:** We were moving offices so we were like 'Let's not even get phone lines in the new offices,' because we had burned through three leases that year as we grew and surpassed expectations. The hard part was the manufacturing because the machines that we needed, the really good ones, are really big, they take up a lot of space, and they're made in Germany or Tel Aviv or somewhere and they don't actually ship them until you order them and it's like a two month lead time so we had to

predict what our volume was going to be and the machines are so expensive that if we guessed wrong and ordered a machine that we ended up not needing it was going to be pretty detrimental.

**Jaime:** How much were the machines?

**Dan:** The first generation of the big machines that we got were about \$350,000 apiece, so it was a big risk, and they're 25x25', which meant that we needed to move, so there was a lot riding on getting that timing right and none of us had a manufacturing background.

**Jaime:** How did you manage that? Did you hire someone to help you?

**Dan:** We just made mistakes; it was trial and error.

**Jaime:** That's nuts. How did you feel going through that? Because most people are like 'I wish I could just turn up the volume on sales,' those are great problems to have for people who are having problems getting sales right now but it's a huge issue to deal with all of the moving parts and possibly upset customers when you're trying to deliver stuff.

**Dan:** Our mentality was that it's okay to upset customers as long as it doesn't continue. We knew that as we changed processes, learned new manufacturing strategies and figured out how to box stuff we were going to have damaged products, put out bad prints and stuff that faded until we learned about lamination and all of that stuff and it was just something that we knew we were going to have to deal with but we were confident that we were going to work through those things and end up with a great product. It was part of the testing process – we used the customers rather than market research or data to tell us how to direct the product evolution, so if we were getting a lot of complaints that's obviously bad but it told us what to do next. If we got a lot of requests for products that we didn't have, that told us where to maybe expand next. That negative feedback channel was a great tool for us to figure out how to grow because we didn't know anything about the sign industry, we didn't know anything about manufacturing, we were software guys and it really shaped the direction of the company.

**Jaime:** Do you think that's helpful? Because some people are like 'We need to know about the industry that we're going into,' and stuff like that. Do you think it's a helpful thing to not know what you're doing in the specific industry?

**Dan:** It depends on the cost. If you've got an industry where there are just a few clients and you can't afford to screw any of them up then, yes, the more research you can do and the more opportunity you have to figure it out and test it as much as you can before going in and pitching to them, the better, but in our space, where there are hundreds of thousands or millions of customers and each one is only going to spend \$150 with us then it's really a little bit different – it's so much cheaper and faster to just let the customer tell us what the right price is, what the right flow through the website is, what the right products are, what the right quality mix is, and so, even today, when we're not sure if the market price is here or here, we could go and do a huge survey and ask 'Would you pay this? Would you pay that?' and ask individual customers the question and come up with a price but it's much easier and faster for us to just try five different prices and see which one converts the best and has the best profit yield and then just switch the other four tests over to that winning price. So that's the way that we operate the business, we just throw stuff out there and let the customers tell us what the best path is.

**Jaime:** Real life feedback.

**Dan:** Yeah.

**Jaime:** 'They're telling us to go this way, this way, this way.' That's awesome.

**Dan:** I guarantee that's going to give a better result than a survey.

**Jaime:** Rather than people going 'I think I would pay this,' where it's all theoretical. I know we have to hurry up – I always ask the same last question and I normally give everyone a heads up but I did not give you a heads up because we were too busy chatting about GoPros but you'll be fine! What's one action listeners can take this week to help move them forward towards their goal of \$1 million?

**Dan:** Oh, man.

**Jaime:** That's why I usually give a heads up because sometimes people look like deer in headlights.

**Dan:** I think there are so many.

**Jaime:** There are.

**Dan:** I think probably the thing that most people have the hardest time with, and I did too, as an early entrepreneur, is that I was head down in my business, in my idea, and I wasn't out there talking to potential customers, peers or mentors, so I think networking is important, especially if you don't yet know exactly what direction your idea is going to go in. Drop the confidentiality bubble that most entrepreneurs seem to have, like 'I can't tell you my idea or talk about it in too much depth because my patent hasn't cleared yet and I don't want you to steal it,' and just be super open about challenges, vulnerabilities and ideas and talk to everybody about it. If you have the time, you're still in that research phase, just have three coffees a day with everyone you can think of and ask each person that you meet with 'Who do you think are two or three people that would be good for me to talk to?' and just get those connections out there, because it's amazing what kind of ideas those conversations will spark, ideas you thought were good where you'll suddenly hear people go 'Uh, you may have to think about this,' and that might be helpful.

**Jaime:** Getting that feedback.

**Dan:** Yeah.

**Jaime:** We went to lunch – it's one of those things where you can actually get feedback before you jump in and have customers.

**Dan:** And someone might just know someone. They'll say 'Oh, you know what? My friend is doing something very similar. You should talk to him,' or 'My friend tried to do that a year ago and hit a bunch of roadblocks. You should talk to him.'

**Jaime:** That's awesome. Thank you so much. Where can we find out more about you and your website and all of that fun stuff online?

**Dan:** You can reach me on LinkedIn or Facebook, I'm happy to connect with anyone out there, and my website is BuildASign.com, so come and check us out, buy a sign.

**Jaime:** Buy a sign! Go buy a sign! Thank you so much for having me here. I really, really appreciate it.

**Dan:** Yeah, absolutely. Thanks so much for having me.

**Announcer:** Thanks for listening. You can find out more great information like this on [EventualMillionaire.com](http://EventualMillionaire.com).